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EFFECTS ON THE GROUND:
SOCIAL UPHEAVAL OR NET
SOCIETAL BENEFITS?

Unsafe Loans in a Deregulated
U.S. Mortgage Market
Vincent Di Lorenzo*
This Article explores actual market outcomes in a
deregulated mortgage market to ascertain if market discipline
can be relied upon to ensure safe and sound loan products. In
3DUW , RI WKLV DUWLFOH WKH EDQN UHJXODWRUV· GHFLVLRQV WR
deregulate the mortgage market are set forth. In Part II, the
outcomes generated by such a legal environment are presented.
Such outcomes reveal steadily increasing availability and
acceptance of risky loan products, resulting in equity stripping
due to subsequent defaults. In Part III of the article, an
alternative regulatory approach is offered³one that imposes a
minimum required level of safety for all loan products.
I. Regulatory Reliance on Market Discipline
In 1982, Congress lifted statutory requirements for
mortgage loans originated by federally chartered banks and
thrifts.1 Titles III and IV of the Garn-St. Germain Act replaced
requirements such as maximum loan-to-value ´/79µ  ratios
with a general authorization to make real estate loans subject
to the restrictions and requirements that federal banking

* PURIHVVRU RI /DZ DQG 6HQLRU )HOORZ 9LQFHQWLDQ &HQWHU 6W -RKQ·V
University. Copyright © 2009 by Vincent Di Lorenzo.
1. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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regulators may prescribe.2 Most state legislatures followed the
lead of the Congress, either by also lifting rigid statutory
requirements or by relying on state wild-card statutes to
achieve the same result.3 In addition, Title VIII of the Garn-St.
Germain Act allowed non-federally chartered housing creditors
to offer alternative mortgage instruments to the same extent
authorized by federal regulators.4
After Congress lifted rigid statutory constraints on
mortgage lending by banks and thrifts in 1982, the regulators
were faced with three possible options as the new form of
mortgage market regulation. The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency summarized its options in 1983 as follows:
1. Adopt a regulation that reaffirms the
limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371
before the 1982 amendment . . .
2. Adopt a regulation that modifies the
limitations that existed under 12 U.S.C. 371
before the 1982 amendment and currently exist
in the interpretive rulings.
3. Adopt a regulation that imposes no limitations
RQ QDWLRQDO EDQNV· UHDO HVWDWH OHQGLQJ DQG
rescinds current regulations which do impose
limitations.5
It chose the third option. The Comptroller justified this
GHFLVLRQLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV´7KH2IILFHEHOLHYHVWKDWDVLGH
from the regulations, factors such as market forces and
management philosophies are the rHDO GHWHUPLQDQWV RI EDQNV·
real estate lending practices. . . . [D]ecisions concerning the
forms and terms of national bank lending are properly the
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI HDFK EDQN·V GLUHFWRUDWH DQG PDQDJHPHQWµ6
Similarly, after initially proposing to retain some regulatory
requirements such as LTV ratios, the Federal Home Loan
2. Id. §§ 322, 403, 96 Stat. 1469, 1499, 1510-11 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
371(a), 1464(c)(1)(B)).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 2009).
4. § 804, 96 Stat. at 1546-47 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3803).
5. Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,699
(Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
6. Id. at 40,699-700.
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Bank Board removed most regulatory requirements for real
estate loans except for two³a loan could not exceed 100
percent of the appraised value of the real estate, and a home
loan could not have a maximum term longer than 40 years.7
By 1996, even these limited requirements were lifted. In 1996
WKH 86 2IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ  DV VXFFHVVRU WR
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, embraced the same,
largely free-market, approach that was earlier embraced by the
Comptroller of the Currency.8 At that time, it converted its
HDUOLHUUHJXODWLRQVLQWR´KDQGERRNJXLGDQFHµ9
In response to the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act,10 the federal regulators were
forFHGWR´DGRSWXQLIRUPUHJXODWLRQVSUHVFULELQJVWDQGDUGVµIRU
real estate lending by insured depository institutions.11 The
regulators made two decisions that confirmed their preference
for a free-market approach to the extent governing statutes
would permiW  7KH ILUVW GHFLVLRQ ZDV WR LVVXH ´JXLGHOLQHVµ IRU
real estate lending, rather than impose regulations setting
minimum requirements for real estate lending operations for
all banks and thrifts.12
The second decision that the regulators made after the
1991 Act was to employ a principles approach in their
guidelines, rather than requiring or prohibiting particular
practices. While initially proposing specific LTV ratio limits,
for example, the agencies ultimately adopted a principles
approach³listing general principles VXFK DV ´SUXGHQWµ
underwriting that should guide bank management in
authorizing specific loan products and practices.13 This was a
7. Implementation of New Powers;; Limitation on Loans to One
Borrower, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,032, 23,035-37 (May 23, 1983) (stating that for
KRPH ORDQV LQ H[FHVV RI QLQHW\ SHUFHQW RI WKH SURSHUW\·V DSSUDLVHG YDOXH
private mortgage insurance was required for the part of the loan balance that
exceeded eighty percent of the value).
8. See Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,952-53 (Sept. 30,
1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590).
9. Id. at 50,952.
10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o)(1) (2006).
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13. Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890, 62,893, 62,897
(Dec. 31, 1992) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 34, 208, 365, 545, 563).
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free-market approach to the extent the 1991 Act would permit
it. The 1992 agency standards relied on bank management to
determine permitted products and practices. They required
that banks and thrifts establish and maintain written internal
real estate lending policies which were consistent with safe and
sound banking practices, including prudent underwriting
standards.14
Abusive practices again surfaced after the 1992 and 1996
revisions to the real estate lending standards. Between 1999
and 2001, the federal bank regulatory agencies issued three
guidances on real estate lending. The first concerned subprime
lending, and it was motivated by actions of insured depository
institutions, who were increasingly originating subprime loans
to increase their profits³loans which exhibited significantly
higher risks of default than traditional bank lending.15 The
second concerned high LTV residential real estate lending, and
its publication was motivated by the fact that insured
depository
institutions
were
increasingly
originating
residential real estate loans in amounts exceeding eighty
percent of appraised value in order to increase their profits³
which created great risks of default and severe losses
associated with such loans.16 The third was an Expanded
Guidance on Subprime Lending, and it was motivated, again,
by the higher risks inherent in subprime lending programs, as
well as, for the first time, by recognition that some forms of
subprime lending may be abusive or predatory.17 Despite
recognition of the emergence of risky loan products, all three
´JXLGDQFHVµ FRQWLQXHG WR UHO\ RQ EDQN PDQDJHPHQW WR VHW
14. Id. at 62,897. The guidelines did contain LTV ratios for different
types of real estate loans. See id. at 62,891-93. However, even the guidelines
specified no LTV limits for mortgages on owner-occupied one-to-four family
residential property and for home equity loans. Id. at 62,893. Other
requirements, such as maximum maturity limits, amortization requirements,
and documentation requirements, were rejected. See 57 Fed. Reg. 36,911,
36,912 (proposed Aug. 17, 1992).
15. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., FDIC
INTERAGENCY
GUIDANCE
(Mar.
1,
1999),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9920a.html.
16. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY
GUIDANCE ON HIGH LTV RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING 1-2 (1999),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9994.pdf.
17. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al.,
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (Jan. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html.
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policies to control the risks inherent in subprime and high LTV
lending programs, and to avoid possible violations of consumer
protection laws.18
,Q -DQXDU\  WKH &RPSWUROOHU·V 2IILFH GLG ILQDOO\
prohibit loans made without regard to ability to repay.19 This
is the only regulatory prohibition that a federal agency has
issued regarding real estate lending standards. The timing is
revealing because it was done at the same time and in the
same regulation that preempted state predatory lending laws.20
Thus, the net effect was to impose far fewer prohibitions on
18. See, for example, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL.,
supra note 15, which stated that:
Institutions should recognize the additional risks
inherent in subprime lending and determine if these risks
DUHDFFHSWDEOHDQGFRQWUROODEOHJLYHQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ·VVWDII
financial condition, size, and level of capital support.
Institutions that engage in subprime lending in any
significant way should have board-approved policies and
procedures, as well as internal controls that identify,
measure, monitor, and control these additional risks.
It also provided, with respect to consumer compliance issues, that:
Institutions that originate or purchase subprime loans must
take special care to avoid violating fair lending and
consumer protection laws and regulations. Higher fees and
interest rates combined with compensation incentives can
IRVWHU SUHGDWRU\ SULFLQJ RU GLVFULPLQDWRU\ ´VWHHULQJµ RI
borrowers to subprime products for reasons other than the
ERUURZHU·V XQGHUO\LQJ FUHGLWZRUWKLQHVV  $Q DGHTXDWH
compliance management program must identify, monitor
and control the consumer protection hazards associated
with subprime lending.
Id.
19. Bank Activities and Operations;; Real Estate Lending and
Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1950 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
7, 34) (enacting a prohibition that applies to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries).
20. See id. at 1906, 1908, 1913-14. Community and consumer advocates
expressed concern that preemption would expose consumers to widespread
predatory and abusive practices by national banks. Id. at 1906. The
&RPSWUROOHU·V 2IILFH KRZHYHU ZDV FRQFHUQHG DERXW WKH FRVWV DQG EXUGHQV
that state predatory lending laws imposed on national banks, id. at 1908, and
concluded that enforcement actions under federal law, such as the Federal
Trade Commissions Act of 1914, § 5, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (2000), can ensure fair
treatment of consumers, id. at 1913-14.
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possible abusive lending practices by national banks.
There is one final point regarding the regulatory viewpoint
WKDW VKRXOG EH QRWHG  $OO RI WKH DJHQFLHV· JXLGDQFHV DSSOLHG
only to the banks or thrifts themselves and their operating
subsidiaries. They did not apply to mortgage affiliates of these
institutions. This failure to extend the regulatory guidance to
bank and thrift affiliates was not explainable by a lack of
supervisory power over mortgage affiliates.
This was
demonstrated by the fact that in 2006, the agencies again
issued new guidelines on real estate lending and, for the first
time, imposed some of those guidelines on bank and thrift
affiliates.21
7KH DJHQFLHV· ODVW UHYLVLRQV RI WKHLU XQLIRUm real estate
lending standards came in 2006 and 2007. An interagency
guidance on nontraditional mortgage products was issued in
October 2006.22 The guidance was motivated by the increased
offering of loans that allowed borrowers to defer payment of
principal and, sometimes, interest (i.e., interest-only and
payment-option adjustable rate mortgages), as well as by
reduced documentation requirements.23
The guidance
continued to rely on bank management to decide the policies
and products that would serve to minimize risks to the banks
and thrifts.24 It made only two changes to its earlier, complete
reliance on bank management and narrow scope of coverage.
First, it cautioned banks to include an evaluation of the
ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH GHEW DW ILQDO maturity at the
fully indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing repayment
schedule.25 It also advised banks to demonstrate mitigating
factors supporting the underwriting decision in the event of
risk layering, such as reduced documentation loans.26 Second,
for the first time, the agencies applied the guidance to bank
and thrift affiliates.27
While the agencies recognized the consumer protection
issues raised by many product offerings, they continued to rely
21. See Notice, Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage
Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 58,609.
24. Id. at 58,615.
25. Id. at 58,614.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 58,616.
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on disclosure to address such concerns.28 Thus, a largely free-
market approach continued to be favored with bank
management determining the appropriate policies to employ,
and products to offer, and consumers determining the risks
such products pose.
The last interagency guidance on real estate lending was
issued in July 2007. It was motivated by concern over the
increasing use of adjustable rate mortgage products with low
initial payments based on an introductory rate that expires
after a short period.29 The final guidance also applies to bank
and thrift affiliates.30
The 2007 guidance reiterates the principles that were
announced in the earlier guidances dating back to 1993.31 In
addition, it includes a statement that prudent underwriting
VWDQGDUGV´VKRXOGLQFOXGHDQHYDOXDWLRQRIDERUURZHU·VDELOLW\
WR UHSD\ WKH GHEW E\ >WKH ORDQ·V@ ILQDO PDWXULW\ DW WKH IXOO\
indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing repayment
VFKHGXOHµ32 The guidance does not prohibit stated income and
reduced documentation loans, but cautioned that such loans
should be made to subprime borrowers only if there are
28. See id. at ´0RUHWKDQWUDGLWLRQDO>DGMXVWDEOHUDWHPRUWJDJHV
´$50Vµ @ PRUWJDJH SURGXFWV VXFK DV SD\PHQW-option ARMs and interest-
only mortgages can carry a significant risk of payment shock and negative
amortization that may not be fully understood by conVXPHUVµId. at 58,616.
´&RPPXQLFDWLRQ VKRXOG KHOS PLQLPL]H SRWHQWLDO FRQVXPHU FRQIXVLRQ DQG
complaints, foster good customer relations, and reduce legal and other risks
WRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQµ Id. at 58,617. See also Notice, Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249, 77,255 (proposed
'HF  VWDWLQJWKDW´,QVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGDOVRHQVXUHWKDWFRQVXPHUV
have information that is timely and sufficient for making a sound product
selection GHFLVLRQµ 
29. Notice, Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg.
37,569, 37,572 (July 10, 2007). The agencies stated their concern that:
[T]hese products, typically offered to subprime borrowers,
present heightened risks to lenders and borrowers. Often,
these products have additional characteristics that increase
risk. These include qualifying borrowers based on limited
or no documentation of income or imposing substantial
prepayment penalties or prepayment penalties that extend
beyond the initial fixed interest period.
Id. at 37,569.
30. See id. at 37,570.
31. See id. at 37,573.
32. Id.
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mitigating factors, such as substantial liquid reserves or
assets.33
With respect to consumer protection concerns, apart from
cautioning that loan underwriting should consider the
ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ GLVFORVXUH ZDV RQFH DJDLQ UHOLHG
upon to protect consumers in the final 2007 interagency
guidance.34
In summary, after the lifting of statutory requirements for
mortgage loans in 1982, regulatory requirements were lifted as
well. The federal regulators relied on bank management to
ensure sound operations, and on consumers to protect
themselves against abusive loan practices. The only loan
products that were actually prohibited in the period from 1983
to 2007 were loans made without regard to the ability to repay,
and even this prohibition was embraced only by the
Comptroller of the Currency, and only for national banks and
their subsidiaries³not for bank affiliates. Other regulators
merely cautioned banks and thrifts, through regulatory
´JXLGDQFHVµ against making loans without regard to the
ERUURZHU·V ability to repay. Thus, from 1982 to 2007, the
UHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHV·GRPLQDQWYLHZSRLQWZDV a reliance on free-
market forces.
II. Expected Versus Actual Outcomes in a Deregulated
Environment
In lifting rigid statutory requirements in 1982, Congress
had two immediate purposes in mind: (1) to ensure an
adequate supply of credit for home mortgage transactions by
33. Id.
34. Id. at 37,572. The guidance also noted that:
Fundamental consumer protection principles relevant to the underwriting
and marketing of mortgage loans include:
$SSURYLQJ ORDQV EDVHG RQ WKH ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ WKH ORDQ
according to its terms;; and
Providing information that enables consumers to understand
material terms, costs, and risks of loan products at a time that will
help the consumer select a product.
Id. at 37,574. These were the only two principles announced.
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allowing more creative and flexible financing, and (2) to allow
banks and thrifts to become stronger participants in the home
financing market.35
However, these immediate purposes must be understood as
qualified by the long-standing federal policy of ensuring the
safety and soundness of bank and thrift institutions.36 In
addition, these immediate purposes must also be understood in
the context of a series of enactments that occurred in 1974,37
1988,38 and 1994,39 all of which were aimed at eliminating
abusive practices in the residential real estate lending process.
Thus, &RQJUHVV·V legislative enactments over the entire
1974 to 1994 period reveal a desire to achieve three outcomes:
(1) to ensure an adequate supply of credit for home mortgage
loans, (2) to ensure that such loans are provided in a safe and
sound manner by banks and thrifts, among other institutions,
and (3) to ensure that such loans do not contain terms and are
not offered through practices that are potentially abusive
toward consumers. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the
means that the regulators embraced to achieve these goals
relied upon market discipline rather than regulatory
restriction.

35. See S. REP. NO. 97-536, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3054, 3081.
36. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (stating that failure
to conduct safe and sound operations is a basis for regulatory sanctions);; 12
U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2006) (detailing the safety and soundness standards).
37. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
533, 88 Stat. 3164 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2616 (2006)).
7KH $FW ZDV DLPHG DW HOLPLQDWLQJ ´>D@EXVLYH DQG XQUHDVRQDEOH SUDFWLFHV
ZLWKLQ WKH UHDO HVWDWH VHWWOHPHQW SURFHVVµ  S. REP. NO. 93-866, at 2 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546, 6547.
38. See Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-709, 102 Stat. 4725 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
39. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1601) (aiming to avoid potentially abusive terms in high-cost mortgages as
well as instances when lenders act in a predatory fashion by targeting
unsophisticated, low-income homeowners). See also S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 2,
22 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1886 (expressing similar
concerns).
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A. Expected Outcomes
Regulators expected that market-based decisions would
lead to innovative loan products, which would maximize
availability of credit and which ZHUH DOVR ´VDIHµ SURGXFWV DQG
practices. Lender self-interest, bounded by the legal mandate
RI ´VDIHW\ DQG VRXQGQHVVµ ZDV UHOLHG XSRQ WR HQVXUH VDIH
offerings.40 Consumer self-interest was also relied upon to
weed out unsafe products and practices.41
Bank regulators were trained in the economic sciences.
This expectation was in line with the prevailing view in the
legal and economic communities.42
B. Actual Outcomes
Did banks and thrifts, as well as the rest of the mortgage
loan industry, choose to offer only loans that the industry
FRQVLGHUHG ´VDIH DQG VRXQG"µ  6LPLODUO\ GLG FRQVXPHUV DYRLG
ORDQV WKDW ZHUH ´XQVDIHµ RU ´XQVRXQGµ IURP WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ·V
perspective? This was the predicted outcome based on a
reliance on market discipline. But what was the actual
outcome?
1. Unsafe Products and Practices
The most revealing outcome is one that examines the
mortgage practices of regulated banks and thrifts. These
institutions were subject to the general prohibition against
´XQVDIH DQG XQVRXQGµ EDQNLQJ SUDFWLFHV43 as well as the
uniform guidelines cautioning against unaffordable loans,
LQFOXGLQJ ORDQV PDGH ZLWKRXW UHJDUG WR WKH ERUURZHU·V DELOLW\
to repay.44 If thesHJHQHUDO´FRQVWUDLQWVµFRXSOHGZLWKPDUNHW
40. See supra notes 6, 18, 24 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text.
42. This view assumes that every individual is a rational maximizer of
his self-interest. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (7th
ed. 2007). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476
(1998) (GLVFXVVLQJ*DU\%HFNHU·VDFFRXQWRIXWLOLW\PD[LPL]DWLRQ 
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (the 2001 guidance
LGHQWLILHGORDQVEDVHGRQWKHERUURZHU·VDVVHWVUDWKHUWKDQDELOLW\WRUHSD\DV
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discipline did not prevent unsafe lending practices by these
institutions, then they certainly would not prevent unsafe
lending practices by non-affiliated and less-regulated mortgage
companies.
The mortgage products and practices that emerged were:
(a) adjustable rate mortgages (´ARMsµ) with low initial rates
that lead to substantial increases in loan payments after the
H[SLUDWLRQV RI WKH LQLWLDO ´WHDVHUµ UDWHV E  SD\PHQW-option
loans in which the borrower could choose an amount to pay,
including a minimum payment that did not include all accrued
interest, until a recast of the payments at a later point, which
would significantly increase loan payments;; (c) loans made
ZLWKRXWUHJDUGWRERUURZHUV·DELOity to repay, including limited-
documentation or no-documentation loans;; and (d) loans made
requiring very little or no borrower equity, including first lien
mortgage loans that tolerated piggyback loans.
ARMs introduce the risk of sticker shock after the
expiration RIORZLQLWLDO´WHDVHUµLQWHUHVWUDWHV45 For example,
DQ DQDO\VLV RI  VXESULPH $50V LQ  LQGLFDWHG ´DQ
DYHUDJH ¶SD\PHQW VKRFN· RI  SHUFHQW RYHU WKH WHDVHU-rate
payment, even if short-term interest rates remained
XQFKDQJHGµ46 However, since interest rates increased in 2006,
the payment shock was estimated to be 50 percent.47 Payment-
option loans introduce the risk of another form of sticker shock,
namely an increase in monthly payments upon recast of the
loan.48 In payment-option loans, the borrower can choose to
pay a minimum payment which does not include all accrued
interest and does not include payment of principal.49 The
a potentially abusive lending practice). See also supra notes 19, 25, 32 and
accompanying text.
45. See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., SHELTERING
NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE STORM 2 (2007), available
at
http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/subprime11apr2007revised.p
df.
46. Id.
47. Id. The figures were based on a 2006 analysis by Fitch Ratings. Id.
2/28 ARMs have a low initial interest rate that is in effect during the first two
years of the loan. Id.
48. Bob Tedeschi, 1HZ 5XOHV IRU ´([RWLFµ /RDQV, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2006, at J13.
49. Jay Romano, 3OXVHVDQG0LQXVHVRI2SWLRQ$50·V, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2005, at L10.
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accrued and unpaid interest is then added to the principal.50
However, when the outstanding balance reaches a certain
threshold³W\SLFDOO\  RI WKH SURSHUW\·V YDOXH³then the
payment option expires and the loan is recast to require
monthly payments of both interest and principal.51
No-documentation or low-documentation loans add the risk
that the lender has no assurance that the borrower is able to
afford the loan, either initially or after a reset of interest rates
or recast of payments. From 2000 to 2005, the number of
subprime loans made without full documentation of income
climbed from twenty-six percent of subprime mortgages in 2000
to forty-four percent in 2005.52
Finally, piggyback loans add the risk that the borrower has
very little equity in the home.53 In the event of a significant
decline in the fair market value of the property, refinancing
becomes difficult or impossible.54 Moreover, the risk of default
LQFUHDVHVVLQFHWKHERUURZHU·VHTXLW\KDVDOUHDG\EHHQORVWGXH
to the market decline.55 By the end of 2006, thirty-two percent
of home purchase borrowers relied on piggyback loans to
finance their purchases.56
The widespread offering of these risky loan products was
documented by research analysts at Credit Suisse.57 Focusing
on the subprime market at the end of 2006, Credit Suisse found
WKDW ´>U@RXJKO\RIDOOVXESULPHERUURZHUVLQWKHODVWWZR
50. Id.
51. Id. (recast occurs at five years or when the outstanding balance
exceeds property value by 125 percent).
52. Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, Do State Predatory Lending Laws Work? A
Panel Analysis of Market Reforms, 18 HOUSING POL·Y DEBATE 347, 361 (2007).
53. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT &
GROWING DISPARITIES: KEY FINDINGS FROM HMDA 2007, at 2 (2008), available
at
http://furmancenter.org/files/KeyFindingsfromHMDA2007FurmanCenterRep
RUWSGI3LJJ\EDFNORDQVDUH´MXQLRUOLHQVLVVXHGWRDKRPHEX\HUDWWKHVDPH
time as a first mortgage to bridge the gap between the purchase price and his
or hHUILUVWPRUWJDJHµId.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. But cf. infra text accompanying note 64 (citing a forty percent
figure found by Credit Suisse in its sample of loans through the third quarter
of 2006).
57. CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: UNDERESTIMATED NO
MORE (2007), available at http://billcara.com/CS%20Mar%2012%202007%
20Mortgage%20and%20Housing.pdf.
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years had provided limited documentation regarding their
LQFRPHVµ58 DQG WKDW´>L@Q$50V>UHVHWWLQJDIWHU
years] represented roughly 78% of all subprime purchase
originations . . . . [H]ome buyers were primarily qualified at the
introductory teaser rate rather than the fully amortizing rate .
µ59
Focusing on the Alt-A market at the end of 2006, Credit
Suisse found that 1) 55% of borrowers in Alt-A purchase
originations had taken simultaneous second mortgages, or
piggybacks, at the time of purchase;;60  ´ORZQRGRFXPHQWDWLRQ
loans . . . represented . . . 81% of total Alt-A purchase
RULJLQDWLRQVµ61   ´LQWHUHVW RQO\ DQG RSWLRQ $50 ORDQV
represented
approximately
62%
of
Alt-A
purchase
RULJLQDWLRQVµ62 DQG ´DGGLQJWRWKHULVNLVWKHIDFWWKDW-year
hybrid ARMs represented approximately 28% of Alt-A
purchase originations . . . setting the stage for considerable
UHVHWULVNµ63
Focusing on the overall market for mortgage products,
&UHGLW 6XLVVH IRXQG WKDW   ´DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI KRPH
purchase mortgages [made through the third quarter of 2006]
LQYROYHGSLJJ\EDFNORDQVFRPSDUHGZLWKLQµ64 2)
DSSUR[LPDWHO\´RIWRWDOSXUFKDVHRULJLQDWLRQVLQZHUH
LQWHUHVW RQO\ RU QHJDWLYH DPRUWL]DWLRQ PRUWJDJHVµ65 and 3)
´>O@RZQRGRFXPHQWDWLRQORans increased from . . . 18% of total
SXUFKDVHRULJLQDWLRQVLQWRLQµ66
A pattern of engaging in risky practices by offering loan
products that layered risks was evident in the industry
JHQHUDOO\  )RU H[DPSOH ´>D@ERXW  SHUFHQW RI WKH SD\Pent-
option ARMs issued from 2004 to 2007 were underwritten
ZLWKRXWIXOOGRFXPHQWDWLRQRIWKHERUURZHUV·LQFRPHVµ67
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 5. The subprime market constituted twenty percent of total
originations in 2006. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 17-18.
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 4. The Alt-A market constituted twenty percent of total
originations in 2006, rising from just five percent in 2002. Id.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Bob Ivry & Linda Shen, Washington Mutual Hobbled by Increasing
Sept.
15,
2008,
Defaults
on
Option
ARMs,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
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Not only were individually risky products introduced, but
there was also a layering of risks. Payment-option ARMs are
especially risky due to a layering of two sets of sticker shock:
one due to the interest rate reset and another due to the recast
of payments. A no-documentation payment-option ARM then
adds a third layer of risk due to an inability to assess
ERUURZHUV· UHSD\PHQW DELOLW\  ,QGustry surveys reveal that
banks and thrifts, either directly or through affiliates, became
primary originators of payment-option ARMs.68 Vague legal
FRQVWUDLQWVLQWKHIRUPRI´VDIHW\DQGVRXQGQHVVµUHTXLUHPHQWV
and regulatory guidelines warning against making loans
without regard to ability to repay did not prevent these
practices at federally regulated financial institutions.69
Certainly, market discipline alone would not prevent these
practices at non-federally regulated mortgage lenders.
Beginning in 2005 and continuing into 2007, the mortgage
industry newsletter, National Mortgage News, periodically
collected
data
on
residential
payment-option
ARM
originations.70 Such data revealed the following levels of
participation by banks or thrifts and their affiliates in
originations of payment-option ARMs:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNSwdt57nTBI.
68. See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
69. Paul Muolo, Option ARMs in Sevenfold Rise, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Dec. 5, 2005, at 1.
70. Id. (stating that ´>P@RUWJDJH EDQNHUV IXQGHG DOPRVW  ELOOLRQ LQ
payment-option ARMs in the third quarter [of 2005], a more than sevenfold
LQFUHDVH IURP WKH VDPH SHULRG ODVW \HDUµ   7KH ILJXUHV UHSRUWHG SD\PHQW-
option ARM production disclosed to National Mortgage News by lenders. Id.
The disclosed figures were estimated to represent approximately sixty
percent of the payment-option ARM market. Id.
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Market Share ² Residential
Payment-Option Loans
Originated by Banks, Thrifts
or Affiliates
52.39 percent71
51.1 percent72
55.77 percent73
60.3 percent74

The mortgage practices of four large banks and thrifts³
Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Wachovia and IndyMac³
illustrate the failings of a reliance on vague legal standards
and market discipline to avoid unsafe mortgage lending
practices.
&RXQWU\ZLGHZDVWKHFRXQWU\·VODUJHVWPRUWJDJHOHQGHUDV
of 2008.75 It originated $73 billion in mortgage loans in the
first quarter of 2008 alone.76
It was also a significant
originator of subprime mortgages. By the first quarter of 2007,
71. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50V/HQGHUVLQ4¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Oct. 1, 2007, at 1. The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were
Washington Mutual, Countrywide, Wachovia, IndyMac, Greenpoint
Mortgage, Mortgage IT (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank), Flagstar Bank, 1st
National Bank of Arizona, Downey Savings and Loan, and Sun Trust
Mortgage. Id.
72. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Sept. 15, 2006, at 1. The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were
Countrywide, Washington Mutual, IndyMac, Greenpoint Mortgage, EMC
Mortgage (a subsidiary of JP Morgan Chase), Mortgage IT, Downey Savings
and Loan, 1st National Bank of Arizona, Bank of America, First Horizon, Sun
Trust Mortgage, and American Mortgage Network (a subsidiary of
Wachovia). Id.
73. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS,
July 24, 2006 at 1. The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were
Countrywide, EMC Mortgage, IndyMac, Goldenwest Financial, Greenpoint
Mortgage, Downey Savings & Loan, Mortgage IT, 1st National Bank of
Arizona, Bank of America, First Horizon, Sun Trust Mortgage, and American
Mortgage Network. Id.
74. 5HVLGHQWLDO2SWLRQ$50/HQGHUVLQ4 ¶, NAT·L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Mar. 27, 2006, at 1. The bank or thrift lenders, or their affiliates, were
Countrywide, EMC Mortgage, IndyMac, Greenpoint Mortgage, Downey
Savings & Loan, Bank of America, American Mortgage Network, First
Horizon, Flagstar Bank, and Sun Trust Mortgage. Id.
75. Complaint at 9, People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-CH-22994
(Ill. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2008), available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.
gov/pressroom/2008_06/countrywide_complaint.pdf.
76. Id.
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Countrywide had become the largest originator of subprime
loans with a total subprime loan volume of over $7.8 billion.77
The evidence that has emerged indicates layering of
several types of risky loans in the industry generally, as well as
at Countrywide³namely, ARMs with a payment option, made
with little or no documentation of income, and requiring little
money down. Thus, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2007:
By 2005, option ARMs accounted for $238
billion of loan volume, or about 8% of loans
originated that year, according to Inside
Mortgage Finance, a trade publication.
At
Countrywide, these loans accounted for $93
ELOOLRQRURIWKHFRPSDQ\·VORDQYROXPHE\
2005, making it the top option ARM lender that
year.
....
Of the option ARMs [Countrywide] issued [in
@  ZHUH ´ORZ-GRFµ PRUWJDJHV LQ ZKLFK
the borrower GLGQ·W IXOO\ GRFXPHQW LQFRPH RU
assets, according to UBS, compared with an
industry average of 88% that year. In 2004, 78%
RI &RXQWU\ZLGH·V RSWLRQ $50V FDUULHG OHVV WKDQ
full documentation.
Countrywide also allowed borrowers to put
down as little as 5% of DKRPH·VSULFHDQGRIIHUHG
´SLJJ\EDFNPRUWJDJHVµZKLFKDOORZERUURZHUVWR
ILQDQFHPRUHWKDQRIDKRPH·VYDOXHZLWKRXW
paying for private mortgage insurance. By 2006,
nearly 29% of the option ARMs originated by
Countrywide and packaged into mortgage
securities had a combined loan-to-value of 90% or
more, up from just 15% in 2004, according to
UBS.78
77. Id. at 9-´>,@Q&RXQWU\ZLGHRULJLQDWHGURXJKO\ELOOLRQLQ
VXESULPHORDQV,QWKDWQXPEHUVKRWXSWRRYHUELOOLRQµId. at 13.
78. Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, &RXQWU\ZLGH·VNew Scare: ¶2SWLRQ
$50·'HOLQTXHQFLHV%OHHGInto Profitable Prime Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Oct.
24, 2007, at C1.
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Cases brought by State Attorneys General also uncovered
a pattern of unsafe lending practices at Countrywide. For
example, in its lawsuit against Countrywide, the State of
Illinois filed a complaint that indicated that:
´)URPWKURXJKWKHILUVWKDOIof 2007, a majority of
the Countrywide mortgages sold in Illinois were reduced
GRFXPHQWDWLRQ ORDQV RIWHQ FDOOHG ¶VWDWHG-LQFRPH· RU
¶OLDU·VORDQV·µ79
´&RXQWU\ZLGH    EHFDPH D OHDGHU LQ WK>H@ SURILWDEOHµ
Option ARM loan market.80 ´2SWLRQ $50V LQFUHDVHG
fURP DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI WKH FRPSDQ\·V ORDQ
production during the quarter ended June 30, 2004, to
approximately 21% of its production during the quarter
HQGHG-XQHµ81
´2I WKH RSWLRQ $50V &RXQWU\ZLGH VROG LQ  
were reduced documentation mortgages in which the
ERUURZHUGLGQRWIXOO\GRFXPHQWLQFRPHRUDVVHWVµ82
Countrywide offered interest-only loan products in
which the interest-only payment feature existed only
´GXULQJWKHILUVW\HDUVRIWKHORDQXVXDOO\WKHILUVW
It EHFDPH ´WKH VHFRQG OHDGLQJ
 RU  \HDUVµ83
originator of interest-only loans from 2006 through the
VHFRQGTXDUWHURIµ84 :KHQLWTXDOLILHGERUURZHUV·
ability to repay, such qualification was often not at the
payment due on a fully amortizing mortgage.85
Countrywide qualified its borrowers at the minimum or
the lower non-amortizing interest-only payment at least
part of the time during the period 2003 through 2007.86
&RXQWU\ZLGH ´DFNQRZOHGJHG LQ D 0D\   OHWWHU WR
the Office of Thrift Supervision . . . that . . . looking at
originations in the fourth quarter of 2006, . . . almost
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Complaint, supra note 75, at 23.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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60% of the borrowers who obtained subprime hybrid
$50VµLQFOXGLQJLQWHUHVWRQO\ORDQVIURP&RXQWU\ZLGH
´ZRXOGQRWKDYHTXDOLILHGDWWKHIXOO\LQGH[HGUDWHµ87
Indeed, Countrywide decided to switch from a national
bank to a thrift charter in 2006 precisely because the OTS
applied the interagency guidelines on alternative mortgage
SURGXFWVZLWK´PRUHUHVWUDLQWµ88
The system of embracing risky loan practices was equally
evident at Washington 0XWXDO ´:D0Xµ   %HWZHHQ  DQG
2007, WaMu increasingly originated subprime loans and short-
term adjustable-rate mortgages, especially payment-option
ARMs.89 ´,Q  DQG  :D0X IXQGHG D WRWDO RI 
billion in payment option adjustable rate mortgages . . . , and,
by the end of 2007, it held $48 billion in [payment option
adjustable rate mortgages] that resulted in negative
DPRUWL]DWLRQ    µ90
,Q DGGLWLRQ ´LQWR  :D0X
XQGHUZURWH SD\ RSWLRQ $50 ORDQV EDVHG RQ WKH ERUURZHUV·
ability to afforGWKHORZ¶WHDVHU·SD\PHQWµ91 It also increasingly
originated loans with limited or no documentation of income or
assets.92
Wachovia was similarly in the business of making risky
87. Id. DW  LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQ PDUNV RPLWWHG   ,Q DGGLWLRQ ´DOPRVW
RIWKHERUURZHUVµIRUVXESULPHK\EULG$50VZKLFKPD\LQFOXGHUHGXFHG
documentation and high loan-to-YDOXH UDWLRV ´ZRXOG QRW KDYH TXDOLILHG IRU
any other [Countrywide] SURGXFWµ  Id. at 32-33 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
88. Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of
OTS, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1.
89. Drew Desilver, Is the Sky Falling? Big Dreams of WaMu Dashed by
Risky Loans, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at H1. WaMu made $452.5
billion in subprime loans, home equity loans, and short-term adjustable rate
mortgages between 2004 and the end of 2007. Id.
90. MICHAEL HUDSON & JIM OVERTON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
THE
SECOND
S&L
SCANDAL
8
(2009),
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-
legislation/regulators/the-second-s-l-scandal.pdf (figures collected from
:D0X·VILOLQJVZLWKWKH6(& 
91. Id.
92. Desilver, supra note 89. For example one individual analyzed a
bundle of loans made by WaMu in May 2007 that consisted of 1,765 loans
totaling $519 million. Mark Gimein, ,QVLGHWKH/LDU·V/RDQ, SLATE, Apr. 24,
2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189576/. In this bundle of loans, eighty-eight
percent did not request verification of income. Id. By March 2008, eighteen
percent of the loans were in foreclosure. Id.
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loans in recent years. It was the largest originator of pay-
option ARM loans in the second quarter of 2007, followed by
WaMu, and held $122 billion of such loans.93 The biggest
originators of such loans at the time were Wachovia, WaMu,
Countrywide, Downey Financial Corporation (a savings and
loan), and IndyMac.94 Wachovia was the largest holder of
option ARMs.95 According to its own website, these mortgages
represented seventy-WKUHH SHUFHQW RI :DFKRYLD·V ORDQ
Indeed, one of the very reasons Wachovia
portfolio.96
purchased Golden West Financial Corporation in 2006 was
*ROGHQ·V IRFXV RQ RSWLRQ DGMXVWDEOH-rate mortgages, which it
hoped to cross-sell to Wachovia customers.97
The same practice of making risky loans was uncovered at
IndyMac. IndyMac was one of the largest holders of payment-
option ARM loans.98 In addition, as recently as the first
quarter of 2007, only twenty-RQH SHUFHQW RI ,QG\0DF·V WRWDO
loan production was in the form of full-documentation
mortgages.99 Finally, some of the loans that IndyMac labeled
as full-documentation loans may have been supported, not by
verification of income, but rather only by verification of
employment.100

93.
94.
95.
96.

Ivry & Shen, supra note 67.
Id.
Id.
Bob Ivry, Wachovia Option-ARM Mortgage Losses May Force Merger,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=
af4TVTdVFB1s&pid=20601087.
97. Matthias Rieker, :KDW·V'ULYLQJ/DWHVW'HDOV" ,W·V1RW &RVWV , AM.
BANKER, May 15, 2006, at 1.
98. See Ivry, supra note 96;; Ivry & Shen, supra note 67. When seized by
regulators, IndyMac held $3.5 billion of option ARMs, the fifth highest
amount behind Wachovia, WaMu, Countrywide, and Downey Financial. Ivry
& Shen, supra note 67.
99. MIKE HUDSON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, INDYMAC: WHAT WENT
WRONG? 3 (2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/research-analysis/indymac_what_went_wrong.pdf. Figures are based
on filings with the SEC. Id. at 3 n.6. One year later, IndyMac had charged
this reliance on limited- or no-documentation loans, but by March 2008, sixty-
nine percent of its loan volume involved full-documentation mortgages,
leaving almost one-third of its loan volume still in the form of limited- or no-
documentation mortgages. Id.
100. Id. at 8.
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2. Equity Stripping
The greatest loss of equity results from unsafe lending
practices that lead to foreclosure. This is a loss faced by
borrowers not only due to the overly aggressive and unsafe
lending practices of recent years, but also, to a lesser extent, in
prior time periods. Recent foreclosures have come in three
waves, representing three stages of risk that result from the
mortgage practices of recent years.
The first wave of
foreclosures, occurring in 2007 and 2008, resulted from
adjustable-rate subprime loans in which borrowers were
unable to afford the reset interest rates and were unable to
refinance their mortgages.101 The second wave is expected in
2009 and 2010, and will result from payment-option ARMs that
recast and five-year adjustable-rate hybrid ARMs.102 Such
loans were made in both the subprime and the Alt-A markets.
A third wave of foreclosures has actually overlapped with these
first two causes of financial difficulty. This resulted from the
unavailability of credit in the tightened mortgage market in
late-2008 and 2009, job losses resulting from a downturn in the
economy triggered by mortgage loan losses of financial
institutions, and a sharp drop in housing prices making
refinancing of a large outstanding mortgage balance
impossible.103
Total loans in foreclosure averaged 455,000 annually from
101. See Kelly D. Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in
the United States: A Perfect Storm, 2007 FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ECON.
REV.
115,
130-32
(2007),
available
at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/4q07Edmiston.pdf
(discussing increases in short-term interest rates and payment resets on
nontraditional mortgages being responsible for the increase in foreclosure
rates on ARMs, especially subprime ARMs);; John Leland, Loans that Looked
Easy Pose Threats to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at A12 (discussing
difficulty of refinancing).
102. See Leland, supra note 101;; Ruth Simon, The Financial Crisis:
Loan Delinquencies Rear Their Ugly Head Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008,
at A3 [hereinafter Simon, The Financial Crisis];; Ruth Simon, FirstFed
Grapples With Payment³Option Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, at A3
[hereinafter Simon, FirstFed].
103. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE
OF
THE
NATION·S
HOUSING
1-2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2009/son2009.pdf
(discussing declining housing prices and tightening of the credit market);;
Simon, The Financial Crisis, supra note 102 (discussing tight lending
standards and job losses).
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2002 through 2006, and then more than doubled to nearly
940,000 by the fourth quarter of 2007.104 This was a jump from
less than one percent of all loans in the earlier period to more
than two percent by the end of 2007.105 As for subprime loans,
the foreclosure rate exceeded five percent from 2001 through
2003, and then again in the first quarter of 2007, and never
dropped below three percent from 2001 through 2007.106
Defaults and foreclosures increased in 2008 and continued
to do so in 2009. In October 2007, the Joint Economic
Committee reported that in the 2007-09 period, subprime
IRUHFORVXUHV ZRXOG WRWDO WZR PLOOLRQ FDXVLQJ ´ ELOOLRQ LQ
housing wealth [to] be directly destroyed through the process of
IRUHFORVXUHµ DQG DQRWKHU ´ ELOOLRQ    LQGLUHFWO\ GHVWUR\HG
E\WKHVSLOORYHUHIIHFWRIIRUHFORVXUHVµ107 In fact, the number of
foreclosure filings has been greater than expected. Thus,
during 2008, foreclosure filings actually occurred against
2,330,483 properties.108 In addition, it was expected that there
would be 2.4 million new foreclosure filings in 2009.109
Two troubling characteristics have become apparent
regarding the incidence of foreclosures in recent years. First,
foreclosures are heavily concentrated in low-income
communities110 and in communities that are predominantly
104. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 103,
at 20 (compiling data from the Mortgage Bankers Association).
105. Id.
106. DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNDERSTANDING
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: RECENT EVENTS, THE PROCESS, AND THE COSTS 3
(2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34232_20071105.pdf.
The foreclosure rate exceeded seven percent from 2001 through the second
quarter of 2003. Id.
107. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING
CRISIS 1 (2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/
Reports/10.25.07OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf (estimating an aggregate
cumulative subprime foreclosure rate of 18 percent during the 2007-09
period).
108. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81
Percent in 2008 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/
ContentManagement/PressRelease.aspx?channelid=9&ItemID=5681.
109. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNITED STATES FORECLOSURES:
IMPACT
&
OPPORTUNITIES
1
(2009),
available
at
http://
www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/factsheets/us-
foreclosure-fact-sheet.pdf. More than eight million foreclosures are expected
GXULQJWKHQH[WIRXU\HDUVEDVHGRQ&UHGLW6XLVVHDQDO\VWV·IRUHFDVWV Id. at
1, 2 n.b.
110. See, e.g., External Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures:
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black or Hispanic.111
7KHDUJXPHQWWKDWKDVEHHQPDGHLQIDYRURI´LQQRYDWLYHµ
mortgage products is that they increase rates of
homeownership and thus provide a net societal benefit.112
Given the high-risk nature of the products which can, and
have, led to default and foreclosure for many low-income and
minority homeowners, embracing an outcome in which
YXOQHUDEOHKRPHRZQHUV·substantial losses are deemed justified
because there is an overall net gain in level of homeownership
is an ethically troubling viewpoint. However, the evidence has
actually revealed that there were no net societal benefits in the
form of increased levels of homeownership in the long-term.
For instance, the Center for RespoQVLEOH /HQGLQJ ´&)5/µ 
analyzed the claimed net gain in homeownership resulting
It
from subprime lending from 1998 through 2006.113
concluded that: ´Subprime loans made during 1998-2006 have
led or will lead to a net loss of homeownership for almost one
Evidence from New York City: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic
Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2, 22
(2008) [hereinafter External Effects] (statement of Vicki Been, Professor of
Law and Director of New York University Furman Center for Real Estate
and
Urban
Policy),
available
at
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080522105505.pdf;;
Press Release, Jeffrey D. Klein, N.Y. Senator, Klein and Senate Dems Unveil
Updated Analysis of Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.nysenate.gov/news/klein-and-senate-dems-unveil-updated-
analysis-sub-prime-mortgage-crisis. Professor Been of New York University
School of Law testified before the House Subcommittee on Domestic Policy
that:
Foreclosures in New York City are highly concentrated in
specific neighborhoods. . . . [H]igh-exposure neighborhoods
tend to have a greater proportion of black and Hispanic
residents, lower median incomes, lower median sales prices
and higher rates of subprime lending than low-exposure
neighborhoods.
External Effects, supra, at 4.
111. External Effects, supra note 110, at 4.
112. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the
Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1 (before this year
´RIILFLDOVSUDLVHGVXESULPHOHQGHUVIRUKHOSLQJPLOOLRQVRIIDPLOLHVEX\KRPHV
IRUWKHILUVWWLPHµ 
113. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN
HOMEOWNERSHIP
2
(2007),
available
at
ON
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Net-
Drain-in-Home-Ownership.pdf.
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million families. In fact, a net homeownership loss occurs in
subprime loans made in every one of the past nine years.µ114
The data showed that between 1998 and 2006, about 1.4
million first-time home buyers used subprime loans to
purchase their homes, but an HVWLPDWHG´PLOOLRQERUURZHUV
who obtained subprime loans will lose or have already lost
WKHLU KRPH WR IRUHFORVXUHµ115 The calculations made by the
CFRL do not take into account the even greater number of
foreclosures that occurred after 2006.
The analysis performed by the CFRL focused on subprime
ORDQV LQ ZKLFK ´LQQRYDWLYHµ DQG ULVN\ ORDQ SURGXFWV DQG
practices prevailed in recent years. The Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University analyzed the effect on
homeownership rates of all loans.116
It reviewed
homeownership rates through the end of 2007 and concluded:
The expansion of mortgage credit in the
1990s was therefore accomplished with
traditional products and without adding much to
risk. The growth in mortgage credit after 2003,
in contrast, came largely from gains in much
riskier subprime, interest-only, and payment-
option loans. These novel mortgage products
provided only a temporary lift to homeownership.
Indeed, the national homeownership rate peaked
in 2004 and has since retreated below its 2003
level.
For the rate to fall below its 2000 level, the
number of homeowners would have to dip by
another million³a real possibility given the
rising tide of foreclosures.117
This experience demonstrates that safe underwriting
114. Id.
115. Id. A majority of the subprime loans that were acquired were for
refinancing and not for the purchase of a home. Id. at 3. Moreover, a
significant proportion of subprime purchase mortgages are obtained by
existing homeowners who buy additional homes³not first-time home
buyers³and therefore do not increase homeownership levels. Id.
116. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 103,
at 3-4.
117. Id. at 4 (internal citation omitted).
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practices can help to achieve the goal of access to credit and
expansion of homeownership opportunities. Mandating such
practices is the proposal presented below.
III. An Alternative Approach: Bounded Decision-Making
In recent years, commentators and even some federal
regulators have recognized the deficiencies of relying on a
market-based decision-PDNLQJ DSSURDFK  )URP WKH LQGXVWU\·V
perspective, a vague mandate to avoid unsafe and unsound
mortgage products and practices often is ignored when the
originator can generate substantial profits from potentially
unsafe offerings.118 From the consumer·V perspective, many
consumers seem unable to judge the safety of mortgage loan
offerings.119 Thus, an alternative to relying on market-based
decisions is necessary. The alternative I propose is based on
principles of complexity theory, and is one I have earlier
advanced in my study of business ethics.120
As applied to the United States mortgage market, an outer
legal boundary must be imposed that requires a clear, fixed,
minimum level of safety for every mortgage loan. The outer
boundary of safety proposed as a statutory mandate is twofold.
First, a maximum LTV ratio for all residential real estate loans
would be mandatory, and this would include a required equity
investment by the borrower. This could be eighty percent, or
perhaps slightly higher, and would prohibit secondary
financing and require mortgage insurance if any loan exceeded
118. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law as a
Determinant of Business Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275 (2007) (documenting
case studies of the securities, automobile, pharmaceutical, and mortgage
banking industries, and drawing the conclusion that a vague legal mandate is
typically associated with corporate conduct that ignores the legal mandate).
119. The Federal Reserve Board embraced this conclusion in 2008. See
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,525-26 (July 30, 2008) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
120. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in
the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 794-98 (2006)
(discussing the legal outer-ERXQGDU\EDVHGRQFRPSOH[LW\WKHRU\·VSULQFLSOHRI
a strange attractor). In that research, I focused on the sanctions that can
shape actual outcomes. Id. at 797. In this Article, I focus on the type of legal
mandate that can assist in shaping those outcomes. A detailed discussion of
the concept of a strange attractor as applied to a legislative scheme is found
in Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social
Responsibility in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 80-84 (2000).
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eighty percent of value. It would be mandatory for each
residential mortgage loan made by a bank, thrift, affiliate of a
bank or thrift, or any non-affiliated mortgage lender. Second, a
maximum debt-to-income ratio would similarly be mandatory.
This could be thirty-one percent, or perhaps slightly higher,
and it would require documentation of income and be
underwritten at the maximum interest rate permitted under
the loan, with payments that fully amortize the loan over its
term.
In July 2008, the Federal Reserve Board issued new
regulations, effective October 1, 2009, that apply to a new
catHJRU\ RI ORDQV FDOOHG ´KLJK-SULFHG PRUWJDJH ORDQVµ ZKLFK
the regulations define in a manner intended to cover all
subprime mortgages and most Alt-A mortgages.121 Under the
new regulations, lenders are prohibited from making loans
without regard to borrowerV· DELOLW\ WR UHSD\ DQG they must
assess that ability based on the highest scheduled payment in
the first seven years of the loan.122 This new approach
recognizes the need for a minimum level of safety in mortgage
transactions. However, the Federal ReservH %RDUG·V DFWLRQ
differs from my proposal in four important respects. First, it
does not apply to all mortgage loans³it applies only to high-
priced mortgage loans. Second, it states no clear standard that
GHILQHV D ERUURZHU·V ´DELOLW\ WR UHSD\µ  7KHUH Ls no maximum
debt-to-income ratio stipulated, which once again leaves too
much discretion in the hands of bank management. Third, it is
missing the other component of safe underwriting that I have
proposed³a maximum LTV ratio.123
Finally, the fourth
difference is that my proposed safety standard is statutory.
7KHUH LV D ULVN LQ UHO\LQJ RQ WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH %RDUG·V
regulation to avoid a recurrence of unsafe mortgage loans in
the long-term.
The Federal Reserve Board issued the
regulation under its authoriW\ WR GHWHUPLQH ZKLFK ´XQVDIHµ
mortgage practices should be regulated.124 However, the
121. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,522. A loan is a high-priced
mortgage loan if it is a first-lien mortgage and has an annual percentage rate
WKDW H[FHHGV E\  SHUFHQWDJH SRLQWV WKH ´DYHUDJH SULPH RIIHU UDWHµ
published by Freddie Mac. Id. at 44,522-23.
122. Id. at 44,523.
123. See also Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 101, at 130-32
(discussing the extra risk of default caused by high loan-to-value ratios).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006).

25

2009]

UNSAFE LOANS

179

)HGHUDO5HVHUYH%RDUG·VYLHZSRLQWKDVDOZD\VEHHQWKDWLWZLOO
intervene in the mortgage market by defining a practice as an
´XQVDIHµ PRUWJDJH SUDFWLFH RQO\ ZKHQ WKH QHW societal costs of
non-regulation outweigh its benefits.125 Currently, this is the
case due to the very high levels of mortgage defaults and the
serious economic repercussions they have produced. However,
when this crisis passes, the Federal Reserve Board might
UHVFLQG LWV UHJXODWLRQ EHFDXVH LWV ´QHW VRFLHWDO EHQHILWVµ
threshold will no longer demand government intervention. In
my view, it is preferable to have a statutory standard of safety
to avoid that possible regulatory change.
The required boundaries of safety proposed in this Article
avoid unfettered individual bank and consumer discretion as to
what products and SUDFWLFHV DUH ´VDIHµ VLQFH H[SHULHQFH KDV
taught us that we cannot rely on market discipline to ensure
safety and soundness. Such statutory boundaries do not
eliminate all discretion or freedom.
Within these outer
boundaries, lenders and consumers are free to structure the
terms of their mortgage products in order WRDFKLHYH&RQJUHVV·V
aim of an adequate supply of credit provided in a safe manner.

125. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674, 1679-80 (proposed
Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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